How Operation Sunrise failled - Lessons learned of the Assassination of Rabin

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On the 4th of November, 1995, Yigal Amir shot Prime Minister Rabin of Israel. The following analysis
will demonstrate the motives of the assassin, how he carried out the assassination, and how the
assassination was made possible. As an internal committee of inquiry of the Israeli security
authorities discovered, many serious mistakes had been made.

General state of security, autumn 1995 in Israel

In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and the PLO’s Yassar Arafat signed a treaty. Rabin succeeded
in gaining ratification of a peace agreement in the Kneset (the Israeli Parliament) by the small majority of 51%
which provided
for Jewish withdrawal from parts of their territories by the Israeli Army for self administration by the Palestinians.
The opposition party, Likud, was against the treaty, and refused under the leadership of Benjamin Netanjahu, any
territory changes in favor of the Palestinians. The terrorist group Hamas, which is supported by Iran, was also a
gainst the agreement, and once more used terrorism to sabotage the agreement. Disastrous suicide bomb attacks
increased the pressure on Prime Minister Rabin to turn over Jewish territories to Islamic Palestinians. Jewish
settlers were outraged at Rabin, and posters showing Rabin in Hitler-like pose appeared during demonstrations.
Rabin was called a traitor to his own country. Although the risks for Israeli politicians by Arab terrorists were
perceptible, some politicians and members of the Israeli government still chose to be accessible to the population.

The Assassin, Yigal Amir

Yigal Amir was born in 1970, the second child of eight. He grew up in a two room apartment near Tel Aviv, considering
himself a ”sephardic” Jew (a Jew from Arab origin.) Religion was important in his life. A good pupil, he attended
the ultra-orthodox Wolfson school. After finishing school, he wanted to study theology. Although those who start
theological study do not have to go into military, he joined the Golani Brigade, an elite unit of the Israeli Defense Forces.
In October 1993, he began his studies in computer technology and theology at the Bar Ilan University. Increasingly, he
became opposed to the policy of Rabin, and organized student demonstrations and trips to Hebron. With his weapons
permit, he bought a Berreta pistol (calibre 9 mm Para) which he later used to assassinate Rabin. During demonstrations,
Amir was arrested twice. During a public function, he hurled insults, and mentioned to friends that he intended to assassi_
nate Rabin. Amir joined the EYAL which was founded in 1991 by one of his friends. Nine months before the assassina-
tion, Amir’s girlfriend broke off their relationship. From then on, Amir became more radical and talked about wanting
to kill Rabin because of the agreement with the Palestinians. Between his political-religious ideas, his
personal disappointments, (and lastly the separation from his girlfriend), he became an assassin.

The victim

Rabin, one of the heroes of the Six Day War, was both admired and hated in Israel and around the world because of his
attempt to broker a peace agreement with the PLO. In his own country, resistance against his policy increased, especially
after the suicide terrorist attacks by Islamic terrorists.

The Scene of the assassination

On November 4th of 1995, one of the biggest demonstrations in Israel’s history took place at the Malchei Yisrael
Square in Tel Aviv. More than 100,000 people in favor of Rabin’s agreement with the PLO attended the event.
Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Perez stood in the gallery which was part of a municipal building at the
Malchei Yisrael Square. In a blind sidestreet, Rabin’s limousine was parked.

The assassination

Since January 1995, just after he was left by this girlfriend, Yigal Amir planned to kill Rabin and Peres. He tried twice
to kill Rabin, but without success. Rabin wanted to visit the Holocaust Memorial at Yad Vashem in June of 1995,
but because of a terrorist suicide attack committed by Jihad el Islami, Prime Minister Rabin postponed that visit. Here,
Amir had planned to assassinate Rabin. In September of 1995, Rabin attended an official opening of a road in Kfar
Smaryahu, but Amir wasn’t able to break through the security measures -so he postponed this attempt. The media
announced in advance, the participation of Rabin and Peres at a peace demonstration on November 4th, 1995. Amir
wanted to assassinate both politicians during that event.

At 5:45 pm, Amir loaded his handgun with hollow point bullets, cocked the Beretta pistol, and went by public bus
to the Malchei Yisrael Square. There, he passed himself offas a VIP Driver, and waited near Rabin’s limousine.

At 9:40 pm, Rabin went downstairs from the gallery to his car. At the moment when Rabin was two meters from
his limousine, Amir shot three times. Rabin was hit by two bullets to his thorax and abdomen. The team leader of
his protection detail was shot in the arm when he tried to disarm Amir. During the struggle, Amir shouted ”They
are only blank cartridges, it is an exercise!” The wounded team leader pulled Rabin into the limo and the driver drove
to a hospital while Amir was arrested by security officers. At 11:00 pm, Rabin’s chief of staff announced the death
of the Prime Minister to the public.

The personal protection on the 4^th of November, 1995

The General Security Services (Shin Bet, formerly Shabak) in Israel is the Interior Intelligence Agency, responsible
for counterespionage and counterterrorism inside Israel and the occupied territories, the protection of members of the
Israeli government, and the protection of foreign dignitaries. It also has the task of protecting all Israeli diplomats
and diplomatic installations worldwide. Members of the General Security Services (GSS) are also engaged in foreign
countries, especially South America and Africa, and for the implementation and training of personal protection units
for foreign statesmen. Unlike Germany and many other countries, the GSS or Shin Bet has the advantage of having the
Intelligence function and the personal protection details incorporated inside one authority so that information can be

passed directly to units inside the organization without taking complicated ways and wasting time. During the year
1994, Shin Bet was undergoing internal power struggles. When the new chief of GSS was appointed, heads of depart-
ments resigned, leaving a gap inside the organization which were still not closed completely in November 1995. A few
weeks before the assassination, the Prime Minister was advised by the Protective Department of the GSS not to attend
public appearances. Rabin did not accept their recommendation, and was not even willing to wear a bulletproof vest
during such events.

Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence gathering is elementary for a proper analysis and threat assessment. Right wing extremists and anti-Arab
Jewish organizations became more and more the focus of the Israeli security services. Raviv, the founder of EYAL, had
been working as a source for the Shin Bet since 1987. Although he was under surveillance and was a friend of Amir
(who was a member of EYAL), Amir apparently escaped the focus of GSS. Amir had been arrested twice while taking
part at antiRabin demonstrations. After checking his particulars, he was released. During a public appearance of
Rabin, Amir was pushed away by security officers when he attempted to approach Rabin. A friend of Amir reported to
the GSS in the summer of ‘95, that Amir was planning to assassinate Rabin. Shin Bet did not investigate. Existing
information was not given to the protection detail in the necessary extent. Also, the increase of attacks against members
of the government had not been correctly evaluated. Due to the assassination of a leader of the Jihad at Malta by the
Mossad, the Israeli security forces were more focused on a suicide attack by Arab terrorists.

The protection during the event

More than 1,000 Israeli police and security officers were deployed for the protection of this event. Counter sniper
teams took positions on roofs, and hundreds of apartments around the square were controlled. Roofs were illuminated,
and parking bans were imposed. The code word for the protection assignment of Rabin during the event, was
”Operation Sunrise.”

On the one hand, there were extensive and strict security measures, but on the other hand, especially around the stairs
to the gallery of the municipal building, security was neglected. The Internal GSS Committee on the Rabin assassination
which was established shortly after the assassination, found out that the wrong evaluation of the security situation and existing Intelligence lead to the failure of the protection assignment on the fourth of November. Several mistakes and
weak points which were not corrected in time lead to Rabin’s death. According to the original operational plan, Rabin
was supposed get
out of the limo near the municipal building, then go inside the first floor. From there, he was to continue on a secured
route which was not accessible to the public, to the gallery, without using the stairs outside. It was planned that Rabin
should leave the gallery after the event to get back to his car by the same route. If this plan had been applied, the Prime Minister had to
walk only a few meters, being exposed. The area could have been secured easier, and the limo could have been parked
just in front of the entrance. But due to unknown reasons, this good planning with its advantages was not applied.
Gaps in the security system made the assassination attempt possible. At 9:25 pm, 15 minutes before the end of the
event, a member of the Protective Department of GSS controlled the security measures at the stairs to the gallery, and
at the place where the limo was parked. Discovering that contrary to the plan, the area around the limo was not secured
by Shin Bet, he ordered police officers to secure the area. But at that moment, Yigal Amir was already in the immediate
area near the limo. A police officer asked him why he was there, and Amir pretended to be a VIP driver who was supple-
mentary ordered. Nobody checked to see if this was true, and no one paid further attention to Amir’s presence. Israeli
personal protection officers always keep the protection circles around the protectee clean, and therefore act much more aggressively than the protection officers of units like the US Secret Service. If they recognize that the protection circles
are not clean, they narrow the circle, making it free from unauthorized people. At the end of the event, Rabin’s protection officers believed, according to the plan, that the area from
the stairs to the limousine would be free from unauthorized people, and would be under the control of Shin Bet. This
was a wrong evaluation of the situation, because the police had instead taken this area under its control, but too late
since Amir had already gained access and was remaining inside the area. Rabin’s close protection detail was informed
too late by radio that
the area was controlled not by Shin Bet, but by police. While Rabin stood in the gallery of the municipal building which
had no direct access from the Malchei Yisrael Square, he was highly exposed to a sniper attack. Therefore, his bodyguards wanted to get him out quickly after the end of the public function, relieved that nothing had happened to him. But relief
has facilitated attempts on politicians in the past. The attempts on US President Reagan, the German Minister of Interior Schauble, and Lafontaine happened at the end of events, when the protection officers thought the greatest dangers for
their protectee were over. When the close protection detail started to go downstairs from the gallery to the limo, police
officers at the stairs and around Rabin’s car had not been informed that Rabin was leaving the gallery, enroute to his car.
This is why the police had not formed a security corridor from the end of the stairs to the car.

The side road on which Rabin’s limo was parked is very blind and was insufficiently illuminated, contrary to standard operating procedures. At the moment when Rabin was two meters from his car, a police officer stood one arm length
inside, behind Rabin. A close protection officer walked beside Rabin, and another close protection officer was about
one and a half meters inside, right behind him. Two additional of the close protection detail, who were part of the inner protection circle, removed themselves too soon from Rabin before he entered the limo, and walked to the other side of
the vehicle. No one among the security officers looked behind. It was at this moment that Amir approached from the
back. When he was nearly between the back side police officer and the close protection officer, he shot at Rabin. At
this moment, he was one and a
half meters from Rabin, and the muzzle of his handgun was just 60 cm away from Rabin’s back. During the following
seconds, the close protection officers reacted according to the drills they had been taught during their close protection training. The wounded team leader pulled Rabin inside the limo, while the other security officers overpowered Amir and arrested him. Foreign Minister Perez was brought inside a building to get him out of the danger zone until the situation
was under the control of the security services. But then, the protection detail committed further mistakes. SOPs were
not taken.

The time for driving to the Icholov Hospital which is 850 meters away, is the shortest route, one minute. But the police
were not able to keep the direct street to the hospital free from people and other cars, so the driver had to take a detour. Another problem - the driver had to stop at several police checkpoints and explain that Rabin was wounded before he
was allowed to drive on. The police at these checkpoints had not been informed about the assassination attempt. It took
seven minutes (six minutes longer than it

should have) before the limo arrived at the hospital. Nobody had informed the hospital about the assassination attempt,
or that Rabin was on the way, although the attempt had happened nearly seven minutes previously. Only after Rabin
arrived, was a hospital team of surgeons put together for the emergency operation. Due to his wounds, Rabin had little
chance to survive, therefore immediate medical help was important.

Observations & Conclusions

Although protected by security authorities with vast resources, many observations and conclusions can be drawn
from this operation for non-governmental close protection operations.

1) Shin Bet possessed intelligence information, but it was not evaluated correctly nor given their full extent to the
protection detail. Private Security services don’t possess the same level of resources, but it is vital that all information
be provided to protective details, and be prepared for the possibility of worst case scenarios.

2) The cooperation between Shin Bet and the Israeli police was unsatisfactory. During big events, different private
security services are in action, having different tasks and areas of control. To prevent gaps, information must be
exchanged, and a permanent communication between team leaders is absolutely necessary.

3) Coordination and teamwork between the various security companies must be implemented before, during and after
an event, and should help to decrease any problems between competing companies.

4). Weak points in their security (which were spotted too late), and their unsatisfactory correction, made it easier for
Amir to kill Rabin.

5) Shin Bet forgot, contrary to the plan of action, to secure the area around Rabin’s limousine. The close protection
detail was not informed about this failure. If there is a divergence from the plan of action, all deployed security officers
must be informed, and the head of operations must immediately close any gaps in the security system.

6) Emergency procedures were not applied. Nobody at the hospital had even been informed about Rabin’s wounds
or emergency arrival. Not only had communications failed, but before carrying out a protection operation, the head
of the operation must make sure that all members of the protection detail are familiar with emergency procedures and emergency routes. Permanent training with simulation of stress, increases the probability that such procedures will
be applied in an extreme situation.

7).The security officers had ”relaxed” their attentiveness, particularly at the end of the event, which was not the end
of the protective assignment. The result was disastrous in that the protection circle had gaps, not all areas of obser-
vation were covered, and an assassination was easily carried out. Security officers must never let down on their alert-
ness, and must be aware of everything at all times. Furthermore, there is no excuse for communications failures.

8) After the assassination, Shin Bet was criticized for having parked Rabin’s car during the whole event at the same
place, and to have shown the position where Rabin would enter his limousine. This writer disagrees with that criticism.
In an emergency, the car must be close to the protectee for his evacuation.

9)  Rabin was not willing to wear a bulletproof vest. Such a vest would have provided him good protection against
the wounds he suffered. This only demonstrates once again, how important it is to wear ballistic protection.

Copyright  P. M. and PRAESIDIA DEFENCE. The author P. M. is a former member German government
security forces. He  has studied “Terrorism and Political Violence” at an university in the USA. He  works
now for PRAESIDIA DEFENCE in Germany.

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